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Abstract 
 The implications a deterministic world might have for moral responsibility has 
long been a topic of philosophical debate. While much current research asserts that 
people are either incompatibilists or compatibilists, we argue that people do not 
consistently apply these beliefs. Instead, we argue that people maintain both the intuition 
that determinism diminishes moral responsibility and the intuition that people can be held 
morally responsible even in the presence of deterministic forces. We presented three 
studies to test the hypothesis that people will ignore determinism information when 1) 
selectively reminded that the actor maintains free will or 2) motivated to punish. We 
found some evidence to support our claim: People lay blame despite the existence of 
deterministic factors. However, this effect depends on the nature of the scenario and 
preexisting characteristics of the individual. Future work is necessary to determine if 
there is an underlying consistency to this effect. 
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Philosophers have long been concerned with the implications a deterministic 
world has for moral responsibility (Aristotle, 350BCE; Hume, 1738; Kant, 1781; 
Strawson, 1963; Watson, 1987). Much debate has focused on what the true state of the 
world is and whether, if we live in a deterministic universe, we ought to ascribe 
responsibility for moral and immoral actions. Regardless of any metaphysical or 
normative claims, however, it would appear that everyday people have quite malleable 
views regarding when an individual is morally responsible. For example, extant research 
on blame has provided significant evidence that intentional immoral actions elicit 
heightened ascriptions of moral responsibility as compared to unintentional actions 
(Alicke, 2000; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003; Weiner, 
2006; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006). But, on the other hand, Gill and Cerce (2013) 
suggest a revision to this framework by showing how blame can be mitigated even when 
a transgression is intentional. This is with information suggesting that the actor’s negative 
intentions were implanted, or established in her mind as a result of unfortunate formative 
life experiences. Implantation information implies a deterministic world in which an 
individual is not the sole architect of her dispositions. Indeed, Gill and Cerce reported 
that implantation information attenuates blame by creating the impression that the 
transgressor lacked free will over becoming a person with negative, immoral intentions. 
Taken together, these works suggest that people generally ascribe blame as if we do not 
live in a deterministic world, but when determinism is made salient—in the form of 
information about an actor’s unfortunate history—their blame ascriptions are 
significantly reduced.  
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The purpose of the research below is to explore the possibility that blaming 
practices are more complex than implied by either the literature on perceived 
intentionality or by Gill and Cerce’s (2013) work on character implantation. We are 
interested in the possibility that observers are inconsistent in their judgments of an 
immoral actor with an unfortunate history: Sometimes they will discount blame based on 
the deterministic implications of the historical information, and sometimes they will 
ignore the deterministic implications of the historical information and blame as if (or 
almost as if) that information was never presented. As will be elaborated below, we argue 
this can happen based on both informational and motivational factors. For example, the 
observer may consider information that results in holding on to the notion of the 
transgressor’s human capacity for free will—focusing on the fact that the transgressor can 
still choose to be a better person moving forward, despite her lacking free will over the 
initial acquisition of negative dispositions. In this way, people perceive a continuum of 
free will: At times a transgressor can be seen as acting fully of his own free will and at 
other times his free will appears to be diminished as a result of deterministic forces 
(though not eradicated). Because of this continuum, it appears as though people maintain 
inconsistent intuitions1 regarding whether determinism precludes moral responsibility—
when, instead, perceptions of free will are a matter of gradation, resulting in varying 
responsibility ascriptions based on this perception. Therefore, in one context, people 
believe that determinism can mitigate control over becoming a certain type of (immoral) 
                                                      
1 We subscribe to the definition of an intuition provided by Haidt (2001): “[An] intuition 
occurs quickly, effortlessly, and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process 
is accessible to consciousness…” (p. 818). However, we endorse the use of “intuition” as 
a matter of convenience: We do not have any evidence nor are we entirely confident that 
the judgments discussed in this paper are the result of an intuitive or deliberative process. 
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person, while, in another, that the actor can be held morally responsible for his negative 
deeds even if his history determined his immoral character traits. 
Blame Depends on Perceived Intentionality 
 Much of the existing blame literature focuses on perceived intentionality and its 
implications for heightening blame. In the prototypical blame scenario, the actor 
produces a negative event and, in response, the observer experiences “negative reactive 
attitudes” (Strawson, 1963) toward the actor. These reactive attitudes include anger, 
dislike, resentment, and indignation, which are collectively labeled “blame.” Prior 
literature emphasizes that it is the observer’s perceptions of the mental states and mental 
activities of the actor that determine how much blame will be felt (see Malle, Guglielmo, 
& Monroe, 2011, for a review). Specifically, research has shown that perceptions of the 
transgressor’s desire to commit an immoral deed (Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Malle & 
Knobe, 1997), identification with the action (Pizarro et al., 2003; Woolfolk et al., 2006), 
and volitional control (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 2006) increase blame ascriptions. Perceived 
intentionality, then, is based on the confluence of several factors.  
 For instance, Malle & Knobe (1997) suggest that the core features of perceived 
intentionality are perceptions of an agent’s desire to harm and perceptions that the agent 
believed her action would produce that harm. Consistent with this conceptualization, 
Lagnado & Channon (2008) had participants read scenarios with information regarding 
whether the act was done intentionally or unintentionally (e.g., Sue dislikes her colleague 
and puts a virus on his computer to damage it versus Sue accidently puts a virus on her 
colleague’s computer), and whether the actor believed the behavior would produce the 
desired outcome (e.g., Sue thinks the virus is likely to cause serious damage versus Sue 
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thinks the virus is unlikely to cause serious damage). Results indicated main effects of 
intentionality and foreseeability, suggesting that participants ascribe greater blame to 
actors who both act on a desire to harm and believe their behavior will fulfill that desire. 
 In addition to perceptions of desire and foreseeability, observers also consider 
whether the actor “whole-heartedly” embraces the behavior, or identifies with the action 
(Pizarro, et al., 2003; Woolfolk, et al., 2006). Indeed, observers consider the actor’s 
second-order desires, or his “higher-order acceptance or rejection of a desire or impulse,” 
when making moral judgments (Pizarro et al., 2003; p. 267). A transgressor who commits 
a negative deed (e.g., Martha steals from the store), and whose second-order desire aligns 
with that action (e.g., Martha is pleased to have done it.), is considered extremely 
blameworthy. In one study, Pizarro et al. (2003) had participants rate the 
blameworthiness of deliberate or impulsive actors who committed transgressions. Results 
indicated that participants discounted blame for impulsive negative acts relative to 
deliberate negative acts. This was mediated by participants’ beliefs about the actor’s 
second-order desire: Participants’ believed that an actor did not have a congruent second-
order desire when committing an impulsive act, but he did have such a second-order 
desire when he had committed a deliberate act—resulting in differential blame 
ascriptions. 
 Finally, blame ascriptions are influenced by the extent to which the actor is 
considered able to volitionally change her behavior (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 1970, 2006). 
For example, when there are capacity (e.g., mental illness) constraints, the actor’s 
volitional control is diminished and she is blamed less. In Weiner and Kukla’s (1970) 
study, participants learned about students who failed an exam. One group failed due to 
  6 
lack of effort, the other due to lack of ability. Failure due to lack of effort is seen as 
controllable (the student could have done better if he had chosen to study more) whereas 
failure due to lack of ability is not (even if the student had tried harder, he does not have 
the ability to do better). Observers recognize that the student who fails due to lack of 
effort made a volitional choice not to study and, thus, that student is blamed more. In 
contrast, the student with lack of ability was not able to choose to do otherwise, and is 
seen as less blameworthy. 
These various perceptions of desire, identification, and control are all part of the 
umbrella concept of perceived intentionality. And, arguably, observers consider these 
mental states and mental activities because the transgressor’s intentionality provides 
information regarding his or her moral character and thus the likelihood he or she will 
engage in negative behavior in the future (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). 
Blame Implications of Perceived Intentionality Can Be Nullified by Determinism 
Information Regarding an Unfortunate History 
Gill and Cerce (2013) argue that the well-documented link between perceived 
intentionality and blame can be broken with information regarding unfortunate formative 
forces in the actor’s history. These forces suggest that the transgressor’s negative 
intentions (he wants to dominate and control others) were implanted (as a result of his 
painful life, full of humiliation), and thus that the transgressor never “set out” to have 
those intentions. Instead, the intentions are a result of deterministic forces, undermining 
the perception that they are a manifestation of “free will,” fully under the control of the 
actor. We tested these ideas in an experiment. One condition described an impulsive (but 
regretful) bully, whereas the other two conditions described an intentional bully whose 
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bad behavior possessed all the features of intentionality noted above: Desire, 
foreseeability, deliberateness, identification, and control. In one of the two intentional 
conditions, participants learned about the bully’s unfortunate history—suggesting that his 
negative intentions were implanted (e.g., the transgressor was abused by his father). We 
found support for existing blame models by showing that participants blamed more in the 
purely intentional condition than in the impulsive condition. Crucially, we also found 
support for our primary hypothesis: Blame responses were significantly attenuated in the 
implantation condition, compared to the purely intentional condition, even though both 
conditions presented identical information regarding the actor’s intentionality (and 
participants rated the actor’s bullying as equally intentional). Finally, a test of mediation 
suggested that blame attenuation via implantation information was fully mediated by the 
perception that the bully lacked free will over becoming a bully. Interestingly, observers 
still believed that the bully was free to choose to stop bullying others in subsequent 
interactions. Thus, a specific free will perception—control of self-formation (as opposed 
to freedom of action)—seems relevant here. (A further delineation of these perceptions 
will be provided below.) 
Free Will, Determinism, and Ascriptions of Moral Responsibility 
 Our claim that deterministic (implantation) information reduces blame by 
diminishing perceptions of free will might suggest that we are taking a stance in the long-
running philosophical debate regarding determinism, free will, and moral responsibility. 
Specifically, our data suggests that people endorse incompatibilism: People are not 
morally responsible if their acts result from deterministic forces. Incompatibilism is 
typically contrasted with compatibilism: People can be held morally responsible even if 
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their acts result from deterministic forces. We argue, however, that things are more 
complex than this: People’s intuitions regarding free will and moral responsibility are not 
dichotomous (incompatibilist vs. compatibilist) but reside along a continuum. Prior work 
however—specifically in experimental philosophy—maintains this distinction, with some 
studies suggesting that people are incompatibilists, whereas other work suggests that they 
are compatibilists. We will review that work now. 
 Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner (2005) were pioneers in the empirical 
exploration of folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. They note that 
philosophers on both sides of the debate claim support for their positions by appealing to 
putatively general human intuitions about determinism, free will, and blameworthiness. 
Of course, neither side actually measures these supposed general intuitions, so Nahmias 
et al. set out to do just that. In two studies, they manipulated a deterministic scenario in 
two different ways. In one experiment, participants were asked to suppose that a 
supercomputer can “deduce from the laws of nature and from the current state of 
everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time” 
(Nahmias et al., 2005; p. 566). This includes the behaviors of Jeremy, who, across three 
different conditions either robs a bank, saves a child, or goes jogging. In spite of being 
instructed to suppose it was a deterministic universe, in which everything was 
predictable, the majority of participants (>68%) indicated that Jeremy acts of his own free 
will across the negative, positive, and neutral scenarios. Also, the majority of participants 
indicated Jeremy was morally blameworthy (83%) for the robbery and morally 
praiseworthy (88%) for saving the child. In a second experiment, participants read about 
a different deterministic scenario, which stated: “The beliefs and values of every person 
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are caused completely by the combination of one’s genes and one’s environment” 
(Nahmias et al., 2005; p. 570). Participants then read about identical twins, separated at 
birth. One of the twins had been raised by a kindly family and decided to return a lost 
wallet; the other was raised by a ‘jerk’ family and decided to keep a lost wallet. Again, 
despite the information suggesting a deterministic universe, and consistent with the first 
study, participants indicated that both actors return or keep the wallet of their own free 
will (76%). The majority also indicated the actors are morally blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for their actions (>60%). Given that the majority of participants indicate 
that the actor is morally responsible—despite being in a deterministic universe—these 
results suggest that folk intuitions are compatibilist. 
Nichols & Knobe (2007) built on the work of Nahmias et al. (2005) and presented 
evidence that observers will sometimes provide compatibilist responses and at other 
times incompatibilist responses. Specifically, they argued that people are incompatibilists 
“in the abstract” but become compatibilists when in the throes of a strong negative 
affective response to a moral transgression. In two experiments, participants read about a 
deterministic universe, where “everything that happens is completely caused by whatever 
happened before it,” including human decision-making (Nichols & Knobe, 2007; p. 669). 
Then, in the abstract condition, participants were asked simply whether it is possible for a 
person to be morally responsible in that universe or, in the concrete condition, whether a 
man who murders his wife and children is morally responsible for his actions in that 
universe. In the abstract condition, the majority of participants indicated that a person 
cannot be morally responsible in a deterministic universe (an incompatibilist response), 
whereas in the concrete condition, the majority of participants stated that the actor was 
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morally responsible for killing his family in a deterministic universe (a compatibilist 
response; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). The authors argue that this divergence is a result of 
an “affective performance error:” People’s true intuitions are incompatibilist, but their 
affective response to the scenario interferes with the proper application of their beliefs. 
 Thus, Nichols & Knobe (2007) found that observers would sometimes ignore 
deterministic information in favor of ascribing moral responsibility. They argued that 
participants ignored the deterministic information because the moral transgression was 
affectively arousing. However, in the Gill and Cerce (2013) study (see above), the actor’s 
behavior was emotionally arousing (the actor was a particularly rude and obnoxious jerk), 
and yet participants did not ignore determinism information, and in fact blamed the actor 
less based on that information. Also, Nahmias et al. (2005) found that participants gave 
compatibilist responses for positive behaviors and neutral behaviors to the same extent as 
for moral transgressions. Thus, the “affective performance error” is not well-supported in 
the literature. Why did Gill and Cerce find divergent results from Nichols & Knobe 
(2007)? We think this may be because in our study the determinism information is also 
vivid and emotionally arousing (physical and emotional abuse)—thus, although 
participants surely felt angry as a result of the actor’s transgression, they also likely felt 
compassion based on the terrible life he had experienced. In contrast, Nichols & Knobe’s 
determinism information was simply an abstract statement that “determinism is true in 
the universe inhabited by this actor—everything is predictable.” Perhaps, then, people’s 
moral judgments are strongly influenced by whatever information is vivid and affectively 
arousing, and that information can be either determinism information or blameworthiness 
information.  
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 Feltz, Cokely, and Nadelhoffer (2009) attempted to expand on the work of 
Nahmias et al. (2005) and Nichols & Knobe (2007). Specifically, the authors argued that 
not all people have the same intuitions regarding determinism and moral responsibility, 
but rather that there are distinct groups that either consistently apply compatibilist or 
incompatibilist philosophies across scenarios. Feltz et al. (2009) presented the same 
vignettes from the Nichols & Knobe (2007) study (regarding a deterministic universe) 
and presented both the concrete (high affect) and abstract (low affect) scenarios in a 
within-subjects design. The majority of participants provided matched incompatibilist 
responses (indicating no one was morally responsible in the deterministic universe) and a 
smaller percentage provided matched compatibilist responses. Only a small minority 
(8%) of participants provided mismatched responses, suggesting that most people use 
consistently compatibilist or incompatibilist theories. Feltz et al. (2009) replicated these 
findings (in a second study) when they provided the participants with the same vignettes 
but then asked whether the actor “acts of his own free will” for both the concrete and 
abstract scenarios. Feltz et al. suggest that the intuitions of most people are consistently 
incompatibilist and that this is true regardless of affect. They also note, however, that a 
substantial minority of people have consistent compatibilist intuitions. 
In sum, Gill and Cerce’s (2013) work on implantation suggests that people have 
incompatibilist intuitions. The work of Feltz et al. (2009) is largely congruent with this 
suggestion. On the other hand, Nahmias et al. (2005) find that people are generally 
compatibilists, holding on to a perception of free will and moral responsibility even when 
an actor’s behavior is fully determined. Nichols and Knobe (2007) corroborate this 
conclusion, at least when people are responding to concrete, affectively charged 
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scenarios. The literature is, to put it mildly, maddeningly inconsistent. Yet, we suggest 
that there is important meaning behind this seeming inconsistency: People do not have 
either one intuition or the other; they have both.  
Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Intuitions Live Side-by-Side Within the Same 
Mind 
 We argue that people conceive of free will capacities as residing along a 
continuum—people view targets in terms of gradations in free will, rather than in terms 
of free will being “fully present” or “fully absent.” As such, they are able to provide what 
appear to be inconsistent incompatibilist and compatibilist intuitions, when in fact this 
apparent inconsistency represents degrees of free will perceptions. Therefore, in some 
scenarios, they have an intuition that deterministic forces diminish moral responsibility 
while in other scenarios they have the intuition that moral responsibility remains intact 
even in the presence of deterministic forces. In other words, blaming practices in the 
presence of deterministic information regarding the formation of an actor’s moral 
character are malleable. Sometimes, as in Gill and Cerce (2013), an actor may be 
construed as having diminished responsibility based on an unfortunate history. As noted 
above, this construal is activated by decreased perceptions of a certain kind of free will: 
Control over self-formation—or the perception that the actor did not have control over 
acquiring the set of immoral predispositions he has today.  
On the other hand, this “incompatibilist response” is not, we predict, the only 
response that will be given when people learn about an actor’s unfortunate history. 
Instead, we anticipate that there are a variety of psychological mechanisms that can lead 
observers to ignore or discount the information about an unfortunate history, blaming the 
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actor as if the history information is irrelevant or non-existent. In this Master’s Thesis I 
will examine two potential mechanisms that I predict will weaken the tendency for 
determinism information—in the form of information about an unfortunate history—to 
diminish ascriptions of moral responsibility: 
(1) Reminding observers of an actor’s capacity for freedom of action: The 
observer is reminded that an unfortunate personal history does not diminish a 
transgressor’s freedom of action, and the actor is steadfastly refusing to use that freedom 
to make more moral choices. 
(2) Activating a strong motivation to blame in observers: The observer is 
motivated to blame based on a sense that immorality is spreading and growing within the 
community (Tetlock et al., 2007). Such a mindset compels observers to focus on 
punishing transgressors in order to restore moral order. Thus, when in this mindset, 
observers should be more strongly focused on factors supporting the culpability of the 
transgressor, not factors that will mitigate ascriptions of moral responsibility. 
I predicted that these processes would reduce the extent to which determinism 
information concerning an unfortunate history defuses blame. In contrast, I predicted that 
these manipulations—especially manipulations that remind observers of the capacity for 
freedom of action—should not influence blame responses in scenarios in which the 
transgressor behaves immorally as the result of a biological or neurological defect (i.e., a 
brain tumor that makes it impossible for the actor to change) because the actor does not 
have freedom of action, nor is he capable of changing his behavior. Furthermore, the 
manipulations presented here should have little effect on a transgressor that is already 
perceived to behave highly intentionally, without any suggestion that he maintains 
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diminished free will capacities. In this type of scenario, blame should already be high (“at 
ceiling”), so any additional blame-amplifying manipulations would be futile. Thus, my 
expectation was that blaming in the unfortunate history/implantation condition would be 
especially malleable. 
What psychological processes underlie this malleability of moral judgments in the 
presence of information about an unfortunate history? We remind the reader of Gill and 
Cerce’s (2013) finding that a harm-doer with an unfortunate history is seen to have 
lacked control of self-formation but as having retained the capacity for freedom of action. 
Thus, when learning about such a harm-doer and his unfortunate history, the observer, 
perhaps implicitly, might vacillate between two thought processes: “Yes, his horrible life 
has ‘pushed’ him toward having deficient moral character…but…he is still a human 
being and human beings are capable of making new choices and changing their ways.” 
To the extent that the second perception is more strongly activated—especially the notion 
that the actor has this capacity for freedom of action but steadfastly refuses to employ 
it—information about an unfortunate personal history will have a relatively weak effect 
in terms of diminishing moral responsibility. In this way, participants’ perceptions of free 
will increase along the continuum—from diminished perceptions to increased 
perceptions—resulting in increased blame responses. 
Additionally, if the observer is motivated to blame transgressors, as a result of 
being in the prosecutorial mindset, this could result in the observer ignoring the 
deterministic implications of implantation information. When in the prosecutorial 
mindset, the goal of the observer is to identify and punish transgressors to restore order in 
society. Any mitigating factors, like determinism information, will likely be discounted in 
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order to achieve this goal. Thus, the activation of either of these construals can disrupt the 
mitigating effect determinism information regarding an unfortunate history has on blame. 
The Present Studies 
Gill and Cerce (2013) showed that information about a harm-doer’s unfortunate 
personal history can nullify the impact of perceived intentionality on blame. This happens 
because such information implies a deterministic scenario in which the harm-doer’s 
unfortunate history has deprived him of control over self-formation. As delineated above, 
however, we expect that people have inconsistent views regarding whether the 
deterministic influence of an unfortunate personal history truly does diminish moral 
responsibility. Indeed, we suggested two mechanisms that we predict will weaken the 
tendency for historical information to lower blame: (a) Reminders of the capacity for 
freedom of action, and (b) Heightened blame motivation. 
Below we present three experiments to test these ideas. All studies are based 
around the research design used by Gill and Cerce (2013) and cross the manipulation 
used in that study with another factor which is predicted to selectively moderate moral 
responsibility judgments (e.g., blame, free will, punishment) within the 
implantation/unfortunate history condition. Specifically, our research design is always a 
3(transgression narrative: caused by biological defect, intentional, intentional with 
implanted character) X 2(moderator of implantation effect: enable implantation effect, 
disable implantation effect). We include the “biological defect” condition to show that 
our moderators do not influence moral responsibility judgments in cases of “extreme 
determinism” in which an actor has neither control of self-formation nor freedom of 
action and, in fact, is scarcely an intentional agent at all (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2007; 
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Nahmias, Coates, & Kvaran, 2007). Figure 1 shows idealized predictions that are 
applicable to all our studies.  
Studies 1 and 2 focused on manipulating the salience of freedom of action 
capacities. In Study 1, subjects were presented with information about how, despite many 
and varied requests to change, the harm-doer persists in his inappropriate behaviors. 
Thus, he is being asked both gently and not-so-gently to use his capacity for freedom of 
action, but he simply refuses to do so. We predicted that, as a result of this additional 
information, observers would give less weight to implantation information and thus show 
less blame attenuation than in a “pure” (no reminder) implantation condition. Perceptions 
of freedom of action are the crucial mediator in this model: The actor’s refusal to change 
emphasizes his freedom of action and his unwillingness to utilize it, resulting in increased 
blaming. This manipulation should have no effect within the biological defect condition 
because those with biological defects are seen as lacking freedom of action, and thus a 
refusal to change cannot be construed as a “choice.”  
 In Study 2 participants completed a manipulation that used their own personal 
experiences to highlight how an individual maintains freedom of action despite prior 
implantation of bad habits in one’s character. Specifically, participants were instructed to 
write a short narrative about a time they exerted their willpower to overcome a powerful 
bad habit or predisposition that they had developed as a result of their personal 
experiences. Based on this exercise, participants should recognize that all people’s 
personalities are at least partly implanted by personal experiences and yet people are still 
capable of changing themselves for the better going forward—highlighting the capacity 
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for freedom of action. With these increased perceptions of freedom of action, participants 
would be less influenced by implantation information and thus blame more. 
Study 3 focused on the motivational mechanism for discounting implantation 
information. Some research suggests that participants are more punitive and driven to lay 
blame when in the prosecutorial mindset, and that conservatives are, by default, more 
likely to be in a prosecutorial mindset even in the absence of an experimental 
manipulation (Tetlock et al., 2007). These findings suggest that the prosecutorial mindset 
is more accessible to conservatives than liberals and, therefore, conservatives may be 
more strongly influenced by this type of manipulation (although Tetlock et al. did not 
find an interaction). In this study we manipulated whether or not participants learned that 
the company the transgressor works for is “going to hell in a hand basket” as a result of a 
steep hike in the amount of office bullying and unresolved harassment claims. We 
predicted that reading about the company’s downward spiral would increase 
punitiveness, resulting in discounting implantation information and thus greater 
ascriptions of moral responsibility than in the “pure” implantation condition. 
Furthermore, we predicted that the effectiveness of this manipulation might vary as a 
function of political ideology. Finally, we predicted that increased punitiveness in the 
implantation condition could likely occur via two processes: The motivation to blame 
could lead to an adjustment of free will perceptions to justify the increased blame 
response or that there would be a “direct effect” of motivation (that did not result in 
differences in free will perceptions). Whether motivation increases blame via one process 
or another is not a crucial prediction for us. Instead, we are more concerned with moral 
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responsibility ascriptions and especially the possibility that they are particularly 
malleable in the implantation condition when blame motivation is activated. 
Study 1: Refusal to Change 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
paid $0.50 for their participation. Data were collected on 206 participants (67 male) and 
12 participants were excluded because they did not complete the study or failed 
manipulation checks. The average age of participants was 39.82 (SD = 15.02). 
 Procedure. The experiment was a 3 x 2 between-subjects design. As in Gill and 
Cerce (2013) participants were randomly assigned to one of three transgression narrative 
conditions that offered different narratives concerning the background of a moral 
transgression: biological defect, intentional, or intentional with implantation (hereafter 
called implantation). All participants read about James, “who is the Vice President of a 
moderately sized company who will often humiliate and harass members of his staff.” In 
the biological defect condition, participants learned that James’ bullying is a result of a 
brain tumor in his frontal lobe that increases his aggressiveness and eliminates his ability 
to inhibit his behavior. In the intentional condition, participants learned that James’ 
bullying is highly intentional (e.g. James has a desire to bully others; even after 
deliberation he decides bullying is an acceptable behavior). In the implantation condition, 
participants learned that James’ bullying is highly intentional but also that his inclination 
toward bullying was implanted as a result of an abusive relationship with his father. See 
Appendix A for all vignettes. 
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 Embedded within roughly half of the James vignettes in each condition was 
information about various ways in which James’ friends and colleagues have attempted to 
convince James to change his behavior (i.e., “James, life is difficult enough without us 
being unkind to each other. Would you please think about what you are doing, think 
about other people's feelings, and do your best to mellow out?”). Crucially, despite these 
pleas, James refuses to change. In the no refusal to change condition, participants 
received no information beyond that in the basic transgression narrative (described 
above). This refusal to change manipulation is meant to remind participants that James 
can make free choices to change his ways—he simply refuses to do so. See Appendix B 
for manipulation. 
Measurement of Blame, Free Will, and Other Relevant Constructs. All 
dependent variable items were measured on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
scale (See Appendix C). After reading the vignette and the refusal to change 
manipulation, participants completed items tapping our two primary dependent variables, 
blame (e.g., I blame James for his bullying) and free will. The four blame items were 
aggregated to create an index of blame (M = 3.73, SD = 1.06, α = 0.921). Seven items 
tapped perceived freedom of action (e.g., Using his capacity for free will, James could 
choose to STOP being a bully), which were also aggregated (M = 3.65, SD = 1.21, α = 
0.900). Five items tapped perceived control of self-formation (e.g., James had free will in 
terms of BECOMING a bully), which were aggregated (M = 2.76, SD = 0.98, α = 0.980). 
A factor analysis confirmed that freedom of action and control of self-formation are 
distinct free will perceptions: Freedom of action items loaded onto one factor at 0.87 or 
higher (eigenvalue = 7.63; 63.58% of variance explained) and control of self-formation 
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items loaded onto a second factor at 0.69 or higher (eigenvalue = 2.29; 19.09% of 
variance explained). 
Then participants completed four manipulation check items to assess the success 
of our refusal to change manipulation (e.g., James has free will—he just needs to USE it; 
M = 3.45, SD = 1.23, α = 0.951). The manipulation check items were meant to be distinct 
from the freedom of action items in one critical way: While both sets of items tap 
perceptions that James has freedom of action, the manipulation check items are intended 
to highlight that he is not using that capacity. Therefore, participants would have to 
recognize that he both maintains freedom of action and that he is not applying that 
capacity—which should be particularly apparent after the refusal to change manipulation. 
Finally, participants responded to two different types of punishment items. Four 
items tapped participants’ preference for punishment that would attempt to encourage 
James to change via the threat of various sanctions (e.g., James should receive a clear 
warning from a superior: You will not be eligible for a raise until you start treating 
others with respect). These punishment items were aggregated to create an “encourage 
him to change” punishment index (M = 3.99, SD = 0.91, α = 0.883). A separate set of five 
punishment items measured participants’ preference for types of punishment that would 
“mess with” James and make his life difficult (e.g., It would be great to learn that one of 
James’ coworkers “accidently” spilled water on his laptop, destroying its contents), 
which were aggregated to create a “mess with him” punishment index (M = 2.35, SD = 
0.99, α = 0.919). A factor analysis confirms that these punishment responses are distinct 
constructs, with the “encourage him to change” punishment items loading onto one factor 
at 0.65 or higher (eigenvalue = 4.50; 50.04% of variance explained) and “mess with him” 
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punishment responses loading onto a second factor at 0.71 or higher (eigenvalue = 2.48; 
27.60% of variance explained). 
Based on previous studies (Gill & Cerce, 2013), the intentional and implantation 
vignettes had already been equated on perceptions of intentionality and negative behavior 
expectations, so those assessments were not completed here2. Furthermore, we were not 
concerned with perceptions of suffering, as our findings in Gill & Cerce (2013) provide 
evidence that this perception does not mediate the effect the implantation manipulation 
has on blame judgments: Even though perceptions of suffering were significantly higher 
in the implantation condition, it was diminished control of self-formation—not suffering 
perceptions—that resulted in mitigated blame responses3. 
                                                      
2 In a previous study, using the same vignettes presented here (regarding James’ 
bullying), participants completed items tapping perceptions of intentionality (e.g., James 
looks for opportunities to embarrass or harass his staff members) and negative behavior 
expectations (e.g., James’ staff has good reason to avoid him during the work day). 
Participant responses were both high and nearly equal in the intentional (M = 4.57) and 
implantation (M = 4.47) condition (t < 1) and both were significantly greater than in the 
biological defect condition [M = 2.90; t (120) = 10.82, p < 0.001; t (120) = 10.08, p < 
0.001]. Negative behavior expectations were not significantly different across the 
conditions (ts < 1.5). Therefore, results suggest that perceptions of intentionality and 
negative behavior expectations are equated across the intentional and implantation 
conditions. 
 
3 This finding may be somewhat surprising given the work of Gill, Andreychik, and Getty 
(2013), which suggests that external explanations reduce compassion via perceptions of 
suffering. However, the results presented in their Study 3 suggest that this mediation 
effect is moderated by identification with the target of suffering: The more strongly the 
observer identifies with the target group, the stronger the relationship between perceived 
suffering and compassion. In contrast, in the manipulation presented here, James is an 
office executive who harasses his employees—thus it is unlikely that observers strongly 
identify with him. We think it is this lack of identification that results in perceived 
suffering not strongly predicting blame responses. 
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Results 
 To test our predictions, we conducted a two-way independent ANOVA with 
transgression narrative (biological defect, intentional act, intentional act with 
implantation) and refusal to change (no, yes) predicting our dependent variables (all 
analyses are based on the same ANOVA model unless otherwise noted). 
 First, we tested whether our refusal to change manipulation was effective and 
found a marginal main effect of refusal to change manipulation on perceptions of James’ 
willingness to try to change his behavior, F(1, 188) = 3.66, p = 0.057. When participants 
were provided information suggesting that James has had opportunities to change, but 
refused to do so, perceptions that James was not trying were significantly higher (M = 
3.57) than when participants were not provided this additional information (M = 3.36). 
Upon further examination of the means, a focused condition-by-condition analysis 
showed that the refusal to change manipulation only affected the manipulation check 
items in the intentional condition: Perceptions of James’ refusal to change were 
significantly higher when the refusal to change manipulation was present (M = 4.52) 
versus absent (M = 4.14), t(188) = 2.00, p = 0.047, d = 0.29. There were no significant 
differences in the biological defect or implantation conditions (ts < 1). These findings 
suggest that people are construing the refusal to change manipulation very differently 
across our conditions. Specifically, the manipulation appears to amplify existing beliefs 
that James is not trying in the intentional condition, but does not affect this perception in 
the implantation or biological defect condition. We had anticipated that the refusal to 
change manipulation would be construed similarly across the intentional and implantation 
conditions (conditions in which—based on the results of Gill & Cerce—freedom of 
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action is thought to be unimpaired), but differently in the biological defect condition 
(where freedom of action is not possible). This assumption is not supported by our data.  
We proceeded to test our primary predictions because, of course, our 
manipulation check items could be flawed and painting a false image of the inadequacy 
of our refusal to change manipulation. Our primary predictions were about blame 
responses. We found a significant main effect of transgression narrative, F(2, 188) = 
119.07, p < 0.001. In this and all subsequent studies, we replicated existing blame 
literature. Thus, we found that blaming was higher in the intentional condition (M = 4.52) 
than in the biological defect condition (M = 2.66), t(188) = 14.72, p < 0.001, d = 2.14. 
Also, we replicated Gill and Cerce (2013): Blame was significantly lower in the 
implantation condition (M = 4.04) than in the intentional condition, t(188) = 3.76, p < 
0.001, d = 0.54. However we did not find a main effect of the refusal to change 
manipulation or the predicted interaction (Fs < 1.3, ps > 0.252). Therefore, we did not 
confirm our primary predictions regarding blame responses: that blame in the 
implantation condition would be significantly higher when the refusal to change 
manipulation is present rather than absent (See Figure 2 for pattern of responses). Beyond 
this primary analysis, we examined whether the effects of our manipulations were 
moderated by Social Explanatory Style, Need for Cognitive Closure, or General Beliefs 
about Free Will. We found no evidence of moderation. 
 Next, we turned to analysis of free will perceptions. We found a significant main 
effect of transgression narrative, F(2, 188) = 91.36, p < 0.001. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that freedom of action perceptions were significantly higher in the intentional 
condition (M = 4.48) compared to the implantation condition (M = 4.22), t(188) = 1.93, p 
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= 0.054, d = 0.28, and the biological defect condition (M = 2.30), t(188) = 16.71, p < 
0.001, d = 2.43. Furthermore, perceptions were significantly higher in the implantation 
condition versus the biological defect condition, t(188) = 15.11, p < 0.001, d = 2.20. 
Thus, we did not replicate findings from Gill & Cerce (2013) that perceptions of freedom 
of action were not significantly different in the intentional and implantation conditions. 
We did, however, replicate our existing finding that freedom of action perceptions were 
significantly lower in the biological defect condition. The main effect of the refusal to 
change manipulation and the interaction were not significant (Fs < 1; ps > 0.399). 
Despite the ineffectiveness of the refusal to change manipulation on blame 
responses and freedom of action perceptions, we did find significant main effect of both 
the transgression narrative, F(2, 188) = 31.36, p < 0.001, and the refusal to change 
manipulation, F(1, 188) = 4.27, p = 0.040, on perceived control of self-formation. 
Replicating Gill and Cerce (2013), pairwise comparisons revealed that participants made 
significantly decreased ascriptions of freedom of self-formation in the implantation 
condition (M = 2.64) as compared to the intentional condition (M = 3.44), t(188) = -5.30, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.77. Additionally, perceptions of control of self-formation were 
significantly lower in the biological defect condition (M = 2.26) compared to both the 
implantation condition, t(188) = -2.50, p = 0.013, d = 0.36, and intentional condition, 
t(188) = -7.76, p < 0.001, d = 1.13. Results involving the refusal to change manipulation 
suggested that control of self-formation perceptions were significantly higher in the 
refusal to change condition (M = 2.91) as compared to the no refusal to change condition 
(M = 2.65), t(188) = 2.04, p = 0.040, d = 0.29. Also, interestingly, although the 
interaction was not significant, inspection of means suggested that the effect of the 
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refusal to change manipulation on perceived control of self-formation was strongest in 
the implantation condition (See Figure 3 for pattern of means). Indeed, the effect of the 
refusal to change manipulation was not significant in the biological defect condition and 
the intentional condition (ts < 1; ps > 0.322). In the implantation condition, in contrast, 
control of self-formation ascriptions significantly increased when participants were 
reminded of James’ opportunities to change (M = 2.84) versus when they were not 
provided this additional information (M = 2.43), t(188) = 1.95, p = 0.052, d = 0.28. Thus, 
the deterministic (implantation) information regarding James’ history appears to be a less 
compelling explanation for James’ bad behavior when participants are made aware that 
many people have put pressure on James to change, but he has refused to do so. 
As for punishment preferences, there was a main effect of transgression narrative 
on “encourage him to change” punishment responses, F(2, 188) = 52.62, p < 0.001. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed that this type of punishment was rated as equally desirable 
in both the intentional (M = 4.38) and implantation conditions (M = 4.3; t < 1). However, 
“encourage him to change” punishment was significantly less preferred in the biological 
defect condition (M = 3.22) compared to both the intentional, t(188) = -8.80, p < 0.001, d 
= 1.28, and implantation conditions, t(188) = -8.90, p < 0.001, d = 1.29. The main effect 
of refusal to change manipulation was not significant (F < 1; p > 0.747). However, there 
was a marginal interaction of transgression narrative and the refusal to change 
manipulation, F(2, 188) = 2.482, p = 0.086 (See Figure 4). Pairwise comparisons did not 
reveal any significant or marginal effects of refusal to change manipulation within each 
condition. There was, however, a weak trend such that refusal to change increases these 
punishment judgments in the intentional condition (M = 4.52) versus when the refusal to 
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change manipulation is absent (M = 4.25), t(188) = 1.43, p = 0.166, d = 0.20. In the 
implantation condition there was a weak trend toward reversal of this pattern: Attempts to 
change James through punishment are less preferred when the refusal to change 
manipulation is present (M = 4.22) than absent (M = 4.51), t(188) = -1.60, p = 0.110, d = 
0.23. There is no effect of the manipulation (t < 1; p > 0.465) in the biological defect 
condition, which supports our prediction that free will relevant manipulations should not 
influence responses there. In other words, participants are responding to the refusal to 
change manipulation differently depending on which transgression narrative condition 
they are in. In the intentional condition, the refusal to change manipulation seems to 
amplify existing punishment responses. In contrast, in the implantation condition it 
appears that participants recognize that although James maintains some freedom of 
action, he does not take advantage of opportunities to change, therefore punishment 
responses aimed at changing his behavior will be ineffective. 
As for “mess with him” punishment items, there was a main effect of condition, 
F(2, 188) = 17.186, p < 0.001. The main effect of refusal to change manipulation and the 
interaction were not significant (Fs < 1; ps > 0.342). Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants preferred “mess with him” punishment items more in the intentional 
condition (M = 2.82) compared to the implantation condition (M = 2.40), t(188) = 2.50, p 
= 0.013, d = 0.36, and the biological defect condition (M = 1.86), t(188) = 5.81, p < 
0.001, d = 0.84. Furthermore, participants preferred this form of punishment significantly 
more in the implantation condition, as compared to the biological defect condition, t(188) 
= 3.37, p = 0.001, d = 0.49. Unsurprisingly, the more intentional James’ behavior is, the 
more willing participants are to condone punishment responses that “mess with him.” 
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Discussion 
In Experiment 1, transgression narratives were crossed with a manipulation in 
which some participants learned that James’ co-workers have done their best to persuade 
him to change but he refuses, whereas other participants heard of no such persuasion 
efforts. Our prediction was that this “refusal to change” manipulation would selectively 
increase blame and other indicators of moral responsibility in the implantation condition. 
We did not find our predicted results: Blame responses in the implantation condition (and 
the other transgression narrative conditions) were completely unaffected by the refusal to 
change manipulation. 
We also examined whether free will perceptions and punishment responses were 
influenced by the refusal to change manipulation. As a result of the refusal to change 
manipulation, participants indicated increased perceptions of James’ control over his self-
formation. This difference appears to manifest most in the implantation condition, where 
information suggesting that James has not taken advantage of opportunities to change 
indicate to participants that he had greater control over his self-formation than the 
deterministic information regarding his history would otherwise suggest. Interestingly, 
these results suggest that the refusal to change manipulation is ‘undoing’ the mechanism 
(diminished control of self-formation) that drives the implantation effect found in Gill & 
Cerce (2013). As for perceived freedom of action, the refusal to change manipulation did 
not influence these perceptions either within or across transgression narrative conditions. 
Our goal when creating the refusal to change manipulation was to selectively activate 
freedom of action perceptions. The results of the free will perceptions suggest that we did 
something other than what we wanted: Namely, we did not manipulate freedom of action 
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perceptions but rather control of self-formation perceptions. Instead of activating the 
perception that James had the capacity to overcome his predispositions, our refusal to 
change manipulation instead increased perceptions that he had greater control over his 
personality development. 
As for punishment responses, the evidence weakly suggested that the refusal to 
change manipulation influenced “encourage James to change” punishment responses 
differently in the intentional and implantation conditions. The refusal to change 
manipulation results in increased punishment judgments in the intentional condition and 
decreased punishment in the implantation condition. While this reversal is somewhat 
confusing (and weak enough as to not warrant extended interpretation), it seems plausible 
that attempts to get James to change via punishment are less preferred in the implantation 
condition because he has not taken advantage of these opportunities in the past, so future 
attempts will be unsuccessful. 
 The question remains as to why we did not find stronger effects on blame and 
freedom of action perceptions. Our manipulation checks revealed that participants do 
recognize that James has opportunities to change and he just chooses not to use them—
but only in the intentional condition. Therefore, it appears that we failed to manipulate 
what we wanted to manipulate: Increasing freedom of action perceptions, specifically in 
the implantation condition. We think this might be the case because, although the refusal 
to change manipulation may suggest that James chooses not to use his opportunities to 
change, it makes no claims as to why he does not use these opportunities. Indeed, it may 
be the case that the manipulation may reinforce that James cannot change—or else 
clearly he would have done so given so many opportunities. In other words, as a result of 
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the refusal to change manipulation, James is seen as having greater control of his self-
formation, but not greater freedom of action. This is an interesting composition of free 
will perceptions that needs to be examined further. Specifically, at first blush, it would 
appear that a manipulation that increases perceptions of control of self-formation should 
necessarily increase perceptions of freedom of action—because it is through exerting 
agentic capacities that individuals are able to control the formation of their character. 
However, this is not necessarily the case (as the results of this study suggest). Instead, 
while the refusal to change manipulation suggests that James maintains some control of 
his self-formation (by refusing opportunities to change), he may not necessarily ‘freely’ 
refuse these opportunities. Although James has contributed to his own self-formation (by 
refusing opportunities to change), he still did not make a “free choice” to develop these 
negative intentions. This may explain why our blame responses are not as robust as 
predicted in the implantation condition. 
 As a result of this experiment, future directions should be aimed at examining to 
what extent manipulations that heighten perceptions of freedom of action versus control 
of self-formation differentially influence blame ascriptions. The results of this study 
suggest that manipulations that selectively heighten control of self-formation perceptions 
may not amplify blame responses very robustly. 
Study 2: Highlighting the Ability of the Self to Overcome Predispositions 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 148 Lehigh University undergraduates (68 male) 
who participated for course credit. The average age was 19.35 (SD = 1.35). 
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 Procedure. The experiment was a 3 (transgression narrative: biological defect, 
intentional, or implantation) x 2 (overcoming predispositions task vs. control task) 
between-subjects design. Participants read the same vignettes about James presented in 
Study 1 (Appendix A). 
 Before reading about James’ bullying, participants either were randomly assigned 
to the overcoming predispositions manipulation or a control task. The cover story 
indicated that this task was a separate study from what was to follow. Participants in the 
overcoming predispositions condition were instructed to “think of a time when you 
overcame—at least for a while—a powerful bad habit in your life” (See Appendix D for 
complete instructions). The manipulation is meant to highlight how all people are partly 
shaped by previous life experiences, yet are still able to change going forward and exert 
self-regulatory control over the actions. Participants were asked about a time when they 
overcame a challenging predisposition, which should highlight freedom of action—and 
suggest that if a person puts in enough effort they can choose the right course of action 
and exercise self-regulatory efforts (including James). In contrast, participants in the 
control task were asked to “think of a time when you had free time and had to make a 
decision about how to fill it.” This task was equated in terms of completing a personal 
narrative task without prompting participants to think of concepts relevant to freedom of 
action perceptions. 
Measurement of Blame, Free Will, and Other Relevant Constructs. After 
reading the transgression narrative vignette and completing the overcoming 
predispositions manipulation, participants completed all of the dependent variable items 
(same items as in Study 1, provided in Appendix C). 
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Results 
 Our primary predictions were about blame. We found a significant main effect of 
transgression narrative, F(2, 142) = 65.66, p < 0.001. Blame was significantly higher in 
the intentional condition (M = 4.03) compared to the implantation (M = 3.26), t(142) = 
5.64, p < 0.001, d = 0.94, and biological defect conditions (M = 2.46), t(142) = 11.48, p < 
0.001, d = 1.92. Blame was also significantly higher in the implantation condition versus 
the biological defect condition, t(142) = 5.83, p < 0.001, d = 0.92. The main effect of the 
overcoming predispositions manipulation was weak, F(2, 142) = 2.09, p = 0.150. The 
pattern of blame responses was opposite of what might be expected: Participants blamed 
more in the control task (M = 3.37) compared to the overcoming predispositions task (M 
= 3.31). See Figure 5 for pattern. The interaction of transgression narrative and 
overcoming predispositions manipulation was not significant (F < 1; p > .402). In order 
to test our predicted effect further, we conducted within condition contrasts. There were 
no significant effects of the overcoming predispositions task within any of the 
transgression narrative conditions (Fs < 1.75; ps > .19). 
As for freedom of action responses: There was a significant main effect of 
transgression narrative condition, F(2, 142) = 73.18, p < 0.001. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that perceptions were significantly higher in the intentional condition (M = 4.22) 
and the implantation condition (M = 4.13) compared to the biological defect condition (M 
= 2.79), t(142) = 10.75, p < 0.001, d = 1.80; t(142) = 10.19, p < 0.001, d = 1.71. 
Replicating Gill & Cerce (2013), freedom of action perceptions were not significantly 
different in intentional and implanted conditions (t < 1; p > 0.474). The main effect of 
overcoming predispositions manipulation was not significant, (F < 1.8; p > 1.74). There 
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was a significant interaction of transgression narrative and overcoming predispositions 
manipulation predicting freedom of action, F(2, 142) = 3.24, p = 0.042. See Figure 6 for 
the pattern of means. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, in the biological defect 
condition, freedom of action perceptions were significantly lower when participants 
completed the overcoming predispositions task (M = 2.53) versus the control task (M = 
3.06), t(142) = -2.85, p = 0.005, d = 0.47. Perceptions of freedom of action within the 
intentional and implantation conditions were not significantly different when completing 
the overcoming predispositions versus control task (ts < 1; ps > 0.689). 
 Next we analyzed control of self-formation. There was a significant main effect of 
transgression narrative, F(2, 141) = 13.61, p < 0.001. Perceptions were significantly 
greater in the intentional condition (M = 2.94) than the implantation (M = 2.29), t(141) = 
4.57, p < 0.001, d = 0.76, and biological defect conditions (M = 2.30), t(141) = 4.49, p < 
0.001, d = 0.75. Perceptions were not significantly different between the implantation and 
biological defect conditions (t < 1; p > 0.963). There was also a main effect of 
overcoming predispositions manipulation, F(1, 141) = 5.11, p = 0.025. Participants who 
completed the overcoming predispositions task indicated decreased perceptions of control 
of self-formation (M = 2.38) than participants who completed the control task (M = 2.64). 
Given that the overcoming predispositions task reminded participants that they have 
acquired personality traits and predispositions from their personal history, regardless of 
any intention on their part to do so, it is not surprising that this task resulted in decreased 
perceptions of self-formation. Importantly, however, it was not our intention to alter 
perceptions of self-formation via this manipulation. It seems likely that this unintended 
effect is explaining the weak reversal in blame judgments we found—that participants 
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blame more in the control task versus the overcoming predispositions task. Although the 
interaction of transgression narrative and overcoming predispositions manipulation was 
not significant (F < 1; p > 0.789), an examination of the means suggests that the main 
effect of overcoming predispositions manipulation may be driven by differences in 
perceptions in the intentional condition: In that condition, control of self-formation 
perceptions were reduced in the overcoming predispositions condition (M = 2.75) as 
compared to the control condition (M = 3.13), t(141) = 1.84, p = 0.067, d = 0.30. 
Perceptions were not significantly different in the implantation or biological defect 
conditions (ts < 1.1; ps > 0.263). These results suggest that our manipulation must have 
made clear to participants that it is hard to overcome predispositions, resulting in an 
activation of diminished control of self-formation perceptions rather than increased 
freedom of action perceptions. 
Next, we examined punishment judgments. Looking at “encourage him to 
change” punishments, there was a significant main effect of transgression narrative, F(2, 
142) = 5.79, p = 0.004. Pairwise comparisons revealed that “encourage him to change” 
punishment responses were significantly higher in the intentional (M = 4.07) and 
implantation conditions (M = 4.03) compared to the biological defect condition (M = 
3.60), t(142) = 3.09, p = 0.002, d = 0.51; t(142) = 2.79, p = 0.006, d = 0.46. Punishment 
responses were not significantly different in the intentional and implantation conditions (t 
< 1; p > 0.760). The main effect of overcoming predispositions manipulation was 
marginal, F(1, 142) = 2.17, p = 0.142. There was a significant interaction of transgression 
narrative and overcoming predispositions manipulation, F(2, 142) = 8.54, p < 0.001. See 
Figure 7 for pattern. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, in the implantation condition, 
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“encouraging him to change” punishment responses were significantly higher when the 
overcoming predispositions manipulation was presented (M = 4.30) versus the control 
task (M = 3.76), t(142) = 2.51, p = 0.013, d = 0.46. This pattern of findings is in line with 
our thinking: Given the reminder that freedom of action remains intact despite a lack of 
control over self-formation (e.g., “I have managed to transcend a bad habit that was 
implanted in me.”), deterministic information regarding James’ history was less 
compelling, resulting in increased punishment responses. Interestingly, the pattern of 
responses was the opposite for the biological defect condition: “encourage him to 
change” punishment responses were significantly lower when participants completed the 
overcoming predispositions task (M = 3.30) versus the control task (M = 3.90), t(142) = -
2.79, p = 0.006, d = 0.46. Given that this manipulation was meant to highlight a person’s 
ability to overcome predispositions and change for the better, it is not surprising that 
being reminded of this capacity reduces punishment in the biological defect condition. 
The manipulation is a reminder of a capacity that James cannot possibly have because of 
his brain tumor. These results are consistent with freedom of action perceptions in the 
biological defect condition: being reminded of one’s own capacity for freedom of action 
facilitated participants’ recognition that James would never have this capacity (due to his 
brain tumor), therefore he has diminished freedom of action and should be punished less. 
However, punishment responses showed a similar pattern in the intentional condition: 
Punishment was higher when participants completed the control task (M = 4.32) versus 
the overcoming predispositions task (M = 3.83), t(142) = 2.24, p = 0.027, d = 0.37. In 
sum, it is clear that participants are responding to the overcoming predispositions 
manipulation differently depending on which transgression narrative condition they are 
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in: The manipulation amplified punishment responses in some conditions (implantation) 
but not others (biological defect and intentional). 
 Finally, we analyzed the “mess with him” punishment responses. There was a 
significant main effect of transgression narrative, F(1, 142) = 3.92, p = 0.022. 
Participants indicated increased preference for this type of punishment in the intentional 
condition (M = 2.21) versus the biological defect condition (M = 1.79), t(142) = 2.80, p = 
0.006, d = 0.46. “Mess with him” punishment responses were not significantly different 
in the implantation condition (M = 2.01) compared to either the intentional or biological 
defect conditions (ts < 1.44; ps > 0.152). Again, not surprisingly, participants are most 
willing to condone “mess with him” forms of punishment the more it is clear that James’ 
behavior is intentional with no determinism information presented. The main effect of the 
overcoming predispositions manipulation and the interaction were not significant (Fs < 1; 
ps > 0.415). 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we crossed our transgression narrative manipulation with a 
manipulation of whether or not participants were reminded of their own past success at 
using willpower to change an implanted bad habit. Prior to reading about James, 
participants completed a task under the guise of a separate study. During this task, 
participants were either told to think of a time when they were able to overcome a strong 
predisposition they formed as a result of their personal experiences or a matched control 
task. We predicted that the overcoming predisposition task would increase perceptions of 
freedom of action and increase blame responses, specifically in the implantation 
condition.  
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Results suggest that participants were significantly more likely to espouse 
“encourage him to change” punishment for James in the implantation condition, after 
completing the overcoming predispositions task. Given the overcoming predispositions 
task, the deterministic personal history information was seen as a less compelling reason 
to mitigate punishment responses. In contrast, in the biological defect and intentional 
conditions, punishment responses were significantly reduced by the overcoming 
predispositions task as compared to the control task—suggesting that this manipulation is 
not influencing punishment responses similarly across transgression narratives. 
Why would the overcoming predispositions task decrease punishment in the 
biological defect and intentional conditions? In the biological defect condition, 
perceptions of freedom of action were significantly reduced in the overcoming 
predispositions condition as compared to the control condition. It seems likely that, in the 
biological defect condition these perceptions are driving punishment responses. In the 
biological defect condition, James is incapable of changing his behavior—as such, 
highlighting one’s own capacity to change may result in placing James capabilities in 
stark contrast to this recognition. Therefore, perceptions of James’ freedom of action 
decrease, as do punishment responses. As for the intentional condition, decreased 
punishment responses after the overcoming t task may be a result of the decreased 
perceptions of control of self-formation—as results suggest that the overcoming 
predispositions manipulation increased control of self-formation perceptions most in this 
condition. Therefore, in the biological defects and intentional conditions, the overcoming 
predispositions manipulation results in decreased free will perceptions, which are 
reflected in decreased punishment responses. In contrast, in the implantation condition, 
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the overcoming predispositions manipulation had no effect on either freedom of action or 
control of self-formation perceptions—yet, it increased “encourage him to change” 
punishment responses. 
Future replications of this study should be aimed at exploring why the 
overcoming predispositions manipulation influenced the transgression narrative 
conditions differently. It seems to be the case that in the biological defect and intentional 
conditions, the manipulation results in participants’ diminished free will perceptions. In 
these conditions, the overcoming predispositions manipulation may have prompted 
participants to consider how they have experienced diminished control over self-
formation or freedom of action in their own lives. In implantation condition, the 
manipulation increases punitiveness, but with no comparable alterations to free will 
perceptions. Therefore, it may be the case that this manipulation is altering an 
unmeasured third variable, which is subsequently resulting in increased punishment 
responses. Some possibilities for this unmeasured variable could be blame-proneness—
which is an individual difference measure that determines he ease and readiness by which 
people are willing to make blame ascriptions. Those higher in blame proneness may be 
more likely to pick up on and respond to aspects of a judgment context that allow them to 
blame more (i.e., additional information that allows for one to selectively ignore 
deterministic information in favor of ascribing moral responsibility). As such, the 
influence of other potential unmeasured variables, whether moderators (such as blame 
proneness) or mediators, should be explored. 
An additional question of interest is why we did not find our predicted blame 
responses in this study. We found marginal increases in blame after completing the 
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control task in the biological defect and intentional conditions. Similar to Experiment 1, 
the overcoming predispositions manipulation altered control of self-formation 
perceptions—although in this study, it resulted in decreased perceptions. Additionally, 
the results suggest that we did not increase perceptions of freedom of action. Therefore, 
the key issue here is that we need to better develop manipulations that can successfully 
and robustly remind participants of freedom of action capacities. It may also be the case 
that reminding participants that they have formed predispositions as a result of a 
formative personal history could have stuck with them longer than the reminder that they 
actually overcame these predispositions—and it was the former construal that influenced 
blame responses. As such, responses for the overcoming predispositions task (which were 
free response) should be coded in terms of whether their focus was on their personal 
success or failure in overcoming predisposition, to determine whether this mediated 
results. 
Study 3: Prosecutorial Mindset Manipulation 
Method 
 Participants. We recruited 180 participants (86 males) from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk and they were paid $0.50 for their participation. The average age of 
participants was 37.64 (SD = 13.52). Thirteen participants were excluded from analyses 
either because they did not complete the study or failed manipulation checks. 
 Procedure. The experiment is a 3 (transgression narrative condition: biological 
defect, intentional, or implantation) x 2 (prosecutorial mindset manipulation: 
prosecutorial mindset or generic information), between-subjects design. Participants read 
the same vignettes about James presented in Study 1 (Appendix A). 
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 Prior to reading about James, participants either were randomly assigned to read a 
passage about James’ company that described how office respect has rapidly declined 
over the past couple of years (prosecutorial mindset condition) or about how 
manufacturing at the company has changed over the past couple of years (generic 
information condition). The prosecutorial mindset manipulation was modified based on 
manipulations created by Tetlock and colleagues (2007) whereby it seems like society 
(i.e., James’ company) is “going to hell in a hand basket” and that transgressors aren’t 
being punished for their violations. This manipulation has been shown to motivate 
punitiveness in the service of restoring social order. The generic information condition 
simply described how manufacturing at the company has changed from an assembly line 
to mainly office work. See Appendix E for manipulation. 
Measurement of Blame, Free Will, and Other Relevant Constructs. After 
reading the prosecutorial mindset manipulation and the transgression narrative vignette, 
participants completed all of the dependent variable items (same items as in Study 1, 
provided in Appendix C). 
Results 
 Our primary predictions pertain to blaming. With transgression narrative 
condition and prosecutorial mindset manipulation predicting blame, there was a 
significant main effect of transgression narrative which replicated our existing pattern of 
findings, F(2, 161) = 60.63, p < 0.001. The main effect of prosecutorial mindset 
manipulation and the predicted interaction were not significant (Fs < 1). However, as 
discussed above, Tetlock & colleagues (2007) have found that the effectiveness of the 
prosecutorial mindset manipulation varies based on political ideology. Therefore, next we 
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looked at transgression narrative and prosecutorial mindset manipulation predicting 
blame, moderated by political ideology. Political ideology was measured on a 1 to 7 
Likert scale (from very liberal to very conservative). 
We found a significant interaction of transgression narrative, prosecutorial 
mindset manipulation, and ideology, F(2, 155) = 11.57, p < 0.001. To illuminate this 
interaction, we computed predicted means separately for liberals (-1 SD on the ideology 
measure) and conservatives (+1 SD on the ideology measure) For liberals, there was a 
marginal effect of mindset in the implantation condition: Liberals blamed more when in 
the prosecutorial mindset (M = 4.24) than in the generic condition (M = 3.75) t(155) = 
1.78, p = 0.076, d = 0.28. See Figure 8. Therefore we found our predicted effect for 
liberals: The prosecutorial mindset manipulation led them to discount deterministic 
information regarding James’ history and to blame more. Conversely, in the biological 
defect condition this pattern was reversed: Liberals blamed more in the generic condition 
(M = 3.15) than in the prosecutorial mindset (M = 2.38), t(155) = 2.81, p = 0.005, d = 
0.45. Although this reversal was not predicted, it is still in line with our thinking about 
differences in people’s responses to biological versus historical determinism: While 
liberals in a prosecutorial mindset are willing to discount deterministic information 
concerning a harm-doer’s history, information about biological determinism remains 
compelling to them even when they are in a prosecutorial mindset. In the biological 
defect condition (where the prosecutorial mindset reduced blame for liberals, it seems 
likely that liberals see the company culture as a further deterministic explanation for why 
James behaves poorly: A guy with a brain tumor might be more easily “swept away” by 
the prevailing disturbed cultural norms at the company. For liberals, blame responses 
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within the intentional condition were unaffected by the prosecutorial mindset 
manipulation (t < 1; p > 0.427). 
 As for conservatives, pairwise comparisons revealed that, in the biological defect 
condition, conservatives blamed significantly more in the prosecutorial mindset (M = 
3.79) than in the generic condition (M = 2.69), t(155) = 3.66, p < 0.001, d = 0.58. See 
Figure 9. Although we had expected that the prosecutorial mindset would not matter in 
the biological defect condition (replicating Tetlock et al., 2007), this result is in line with 
the general idea that motivation to blame can lead to the discounting of determinism 
information (although it is inconsistent with our expectation that this will happen more 
for historical rather than biological determinism). Specifically, the biological defect 
condition is a kind of deterministic scenario (i.e., James has a brain tumor that he does 
not choose to have and cannot change). Conservatives appear to discount the blame-
reducing implications of that information when we put them in a prosecutorial mindset. 
For conservatives, blame responses in the intentional and implantation conditions were 
unaffected by the prosecutorial mindset manipulation (ts < 1; ps > 0.416). 
We wondered whether the prosecutorial mindset manipulation resulted in an 
adjustment of free will perceptions or whether there was a “direct effect” of motivation 
on blame. For perceptions of freedom of action, there was a significant main effect of 
transgression narrative, F(2, 155) = 33.96, p < 0.001. Perceptions were significantly 
lower in the biological defect condition (M = 2.75) versus the implantation (M = 4.37), 
t(155) = 11.90, p < 0.001, d = 1.91, and intentional conditions (M = 4.55), t(155) = 13.28, 
p < 0.001, d = 2.13. Perceptions were not significantly different in the intentional and 
implantation conditions (t < 1.3; p > 0.193). There were also significant interactions of 
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transgression narrative by motivation manipulation, F(2, 155) = 5.198, p = 0.007, and 
transgression narrative by ideology, F(2, 155) = 3.83, p = 0.024. These interactions were 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction of transgression narrative, prosecutorial 
mindset manipulation, and ideology, F(2, 155) = 8.10, p < 0.001 (See Figures 10 and 11 
for the pattern of means computed separately for liberals and conservatives). First, we 
will consider liberals. Pairwise comparisons revealed that in the biological defect 
condition, liberals indicated lowered perceptions of freedom of action in the prosecutorial 
mindset condition (M = 2.11) as compared to the generic condition (M = 2.80), t(155) = 
2.52, p = 0.012, d = 0.40. This pattern of responses is consistent with blame responses: 
Liberals blame less in the prosecutorial mindset and this is reflected in their decreased 
perceptions of freedom of action. Liberals’ perceptions of freedom of action in the 
intentional or implantation conditions were unaffected by the prosecutorial mindset 
manipulation (ts < 1; ps > 0.641). 
As for conservatives, pairwise comparisons revealed that, in the biological defect 
condition, perceptions of freedom of action are significantly higher in the prosecutorial 
mindset (M = 3.50) versus the generic condition (M = 2.59), t(155) = 3.09, p = 0.002, d = 
0.49. As with liberals, this pattern parallels their blame judgments. Furthermore, for 
conservatives, in the implantation condition, perceptions of freedom of action were 
significantly higher in the generic condition (M = 4.55) versus the prosecutorial mindset 
manipulation (M = 4.02), t(155) = 2.16, p = 0.032, d = 0.34. Interestingly, this result has 
no parallel in conservatives’ blame responses. Conservatives’ perceptions of freedom of 
action in the intentional condition were unaffected by the prosecutorial mindset 
manipulation (t < 1; p > 0.460). 
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Next, we analyzed perceived control of self-formation. There was a significant 
main effect of transgression narrative, F(2, 155) = 6.01, p = 0.003. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that perceptions of control of self-formation were significantly higher in the 
intentional condition (M = 3.64) compared to the implantation (M = 2.63), t(155) = 6.03, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.96, and biological defect conditions (M = 2.63), t(155) = 5.94, p < 0.001, 
d = 0.95. Perceptions were not significantly different in the implantation condition 
compared to the biological defect condition (t < 1; p > 0.983). There was also a 
significant main effect of ideology, F(1, 155) = 5.02, p = 0.026. Again, there was a three-
way interaction of transgression narrative, prosecutorial mindset manipulation, and 
ideology for perceptions of control over self-formation, F(2, 155) = 4.39, p = 0.014 (See 
Figures 12 and 13 for pattern of means presented separately for liberals and 
conservatives). For liberals, perceptions of control of self-formation were unaffected by 
the prosecutorial mindset manipulation in each of the transgression narrative conditions 
(ts < 1; ps > 0.396). Therefore, for liberals in the implantation condition, perceptions of 
control of self-formation did not parallel blame responses, suggesting a “direct effect” of 
motivation on blame responses.  
 For conservatives, there was no effect of the prosecutorial mindset manipulation 
on perceptions of control over self-formation in the intentional or implantation conditions 
(ts < 1; ps > 0.509). In the biological defect condition, however, perceptions were 
significantly higher in the prosecutorial mindset condition (M = 3.59) versus the generic 
condition (M = 2.28), t(155) = 3.51, p = 0.001, d = 0.56. Therefore, for conservatives in 
the biological defect condition, it appears that differences in blame responses as a result 
of the motivation manipulation resulted in analogous changes in ascriptions of control of 
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self-formation, presumably to justify the increased blame responses. In sum, 
conservatives blame James more in the biological defect condition when in the 
prosecutorial mindset, and this is paralleled by changes in their perceptions of James’ 
freedom of action and control of his self-formation. 
 Next, we used path analysis to test possible mediational pathways. We will focus 
on the biological defect condition, as that is the only condition in which meditation of 
blame judgments by free will perceptions is possible (e.g., in the implantation condition, 
liberals blamed differentially based on mindset, but their free will perceptions showed no 
such pattern and thus cannot be mediating their blame judgments; in the implantation 
condition, conservatives had different free will perceptions based on mindset, but their 
blame judgments showed no such pattern, and thus there is no blame effect to be 
meditated).  
We tested the extent to which the effect of the prosecutorial mindset on blame in 
the biological defect condition was mediated by perceptions of freedom of action and, in 
a separate analysis, by perceptions of control of self-formation. Because our ANOVA 
results indicated that the influence of mindset on blame and free will perceptions differed 
as a function of ideology, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis. We computed 
the analysis using the macros available at (http://www.afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-
macros-and-code.html; Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007) and we tested their Model 2. 
Please see Figure 14 for the models we tested. These models stipulated that the mindset 
manipulation affected free will perceptions (freedom of action, control of self-formation), 
that the effect of mindset on free will perceptions was moderated by ideology, and that 
free will perceptions contributed to blame.  
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In the model examining perceived freedom of action, we uncovered a significant 
interaction between mindset and ideology for predicting freedom of action, t(49) = 2.74, 
p = .008.  As can be seen in Figure 15 (and consistent with the ANOVA results above), 
the mindset manipulation had quite different effects on perceived freedom of action 
among liberals versus conservatives. Among conservatives, perceived freedom of action 
was higher in the prosecutorial mindset condition than in the generic condition, whereas 
among liberals this pattern was reversed. As can be seen underneath the path models in 
Figure 15, the mediated effect of mindset on blame traveling through freedom of action 
was significant for both conservatives and liberals according to bootstrap methods (and 
marginal according to a Sobel test). Thus, when judging a harm-doer with a biological 
defect, being in a prosecutorial mindset heightens blame among conservatives by 
increasing their judgment that the harm-doer has freedom of action, but decreases blame 
among liberals by lowering their judgment that the harm-doer has freedom of action.  
Next, we examined control of self-formation as a mediator. There was a 
significant interaction between mindset and ideology for predicting control of self-
formation, t(49) = 2.62, p = 0.011. As can be seen in Figure 16 (and consistent with the 
ANOVA results above), the mindset manipulation influenced perceptions of control of 
self-formation differently among liberals versus conservatives. Among conservatives, 
perceived control of self-formation was higher for those in the prosecutorial mindset than 
in the generic condition, whereas among liberals perceived control of self-formation was 
unaffected by the prosecutorial mindset manipulation. As can be seen under the path 
models presented in Figure 16, the mediated effect of mindset on blame, traveling 
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through control of self-formation perceptions, was significant for conservatives—but not 
for liberals—according to bootstrap and a Sobel test. 
Therefore, free will perceptions significantly mediate blame responses in the 
biological defect condition. Conservatives show significant mediated pathways for both 
freedom of action and control of self-formation but liberals only show a significant 
mediated pathway for freedom of action perceptions. In contrast to these meditational 
pathways, results in the implantation condition suggest more of a “direct effect” of the 
prosecutorial mindset manipulation on liberals blame responses (i.e., no mediation by 
free will perceptions). 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 3, we crossed our transgression narrative manipulation with a 
prosecutorial mindset manipulation. Prior to reading about James, participants read about 
the company James works for: Either generic information about how the company has 
changed over time or a prosecutorial mindset manipulation, which emphasizes how 
harassment and bullying at the company has skyrocketed. Results suggest that the 
mindset manipulation was influential, but in different ways for liberals and conservatives 
(in line with existing literature by Tetlock and colleagues, 2007). In the implantation 
condition, liberals fit our predictions: They blamed more when in the prosecutorial rather 
than generic mindset. Interestingly, however, this increase in blame responses was not 
associated with any changes in free will perceptions, suggesting a “direct effect” of the 
motivation manipulation (or mediation by an unmeasured variable). In contrast, in the 
biological defect condition, liberals blamed less in the prosecutorial mindset. We think 
this is because, in the biological defect condition, liberals may think that not only does 
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James have a brain tumor, but also he works in an office culture that facilitates 
inappropriate behavior—making it very difficult for a biologically impaired person such 
as James to behave more positively. This decreased blaming by liberals was mediated by 
reduced perceptions of James’ freedom of action. 
 Conservatives showed a different pattern of responses. They were unaffected by 
the prosecutorial mindset manipulation in the intentional and implantation conditions. In 
the biological defect condition, however, conservatives blamed more in the prosecutorial 
mindset than in the generic condition. This increased blaming was mediated by both 
increased freedom of action and increased control of self-formation perceptions. While 
this finding was somewhat unexpected [after all, when James has a brain tumor he is 
consistently blamed less, and Tetlock et al. (2007) showed that blaming of those with 
biological defects was unaffected by a prosecutorial mindset manipulation], it is still, in a 
sense, in line with our thinking. Specifically, the brain tumor information is a type of 
deterministic scenario. And, perhaps conservatives find the deterministic implications 
less than fully compelling (e.g., “James could use willpower to overcome the effects of 
his brain tumor”), creating malleability in their judgments of that type of deterministic 
scenario. Why conservatives would find an unfortunate history to be more consistently 
compelling than a brain tumor in terms of blame reduction is a mystery. 
We found that the prosecutorial mindset manipulation was effective for liberals in 
the implantation condition but not conservatives. We think this divergence in responses 
may have to do with the nature of our vignettes. Tetlock and colleagues (2007) have 
found that the liberals are more susceptible to the prosecutorial mindset manipulation 
when it pertains to punishing people in positions of power. Therefore, since James is the 
  48 
vice president of the company he works for, he is likely seen as largely contributing to 
the harassment problems at the company in the prosecutorial mindset—and liberals are 
particularly influenced by this kind of information. In contrast, our prosecutorial mindset 
manipulation may have been more effective in the implantation condition if the scenario 
pertained to street crime, which conservatives are more likely to be swayed by (Tetlock et 
al., 2007). Future replications of this study should be aimed at confirming this hypothesis: 
Does James’ position in the company hierarchy influence the way he is perceived by 
different groups? Furthermore, is it this perception that amplifies blame responses for 
liberals in the implantation condition? 
Another interesting question is why some deterministic scenarios are more 
compelling to some groups over others. Why are conservatives more willing to blame 
James in the biological defect condition but not the implantation condition, when in the 
prosecutorial mindset? It may be the case that the specific nature of having a brain tumor 
or neurological defect is considered a less ‘legitimate’ excuse for poor behavior for 
conservatives—but why? Similarly, liberals’ intuitions about determinism and moral 
responsibility were more malleable than those of conservatives in the implantation 
condition. Is a person’s unfortunate personal history less compelling reason for liberals as 
to why a person should not be considered morally responsible? This thought process does 
not seem likely. Additional studies are needed to further understand when a deterministic 
scenario will be compelling and legitimate for some groups or individuals but not for 
others. 
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General Discussion 
The philosophy literature highlights how perceptions of free will and determinism 
are influential in determining ascriptions of moral responsibility. However, while much 
current research attempts to determine whether people are compatibilist or 
incompatibilist, we offered the prediction that people can flip-flop between these two 
positions based on their intuition that free will resides along a continuum. That is, we 
have argued that people are able to maintain malleable intuitions regarding whether 
deterministic forces diminish moral responsibility. Our previous work (Gill & Cerce, 
2013) has suggested that deterministic information regarding a wrongdoer’s unfortunate 
history lowers blame of the wrongdoer, mediated by the sense that he or she lacked 
control over self-formation. In the present studies, our focus was on the possibility that 
people would be inconsistent in terms of using information about an unfortunate history 
in this way. We predicted that sometimes, in contrast to the finding of Gill and Cerce 
(2013), information about an unfortunate history would not much have much of an effect 
on moral responsibility judgments. 
We developed predictions about two processes that would moderate the tendency 
for historical information to reduce blame. One process involves activating the idea that 
the wrongdoer could be trying harder—utilizing his or her capacity for freedom of 
action—to behave more appropriately. We reasoned that activation of this idea should 
have no effect in the biological defect condition because people view biological defects 
as taking away freedom of action (Gill & Cerce, 2013), and thus the wrongdoer has no 
such capacity to utilize. We also expected that activation of this idea should have no 
effect in the intentional condition because blame is already “at ceiling” there. We 
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expected activation of this idea to selectively increase blame in the implantation 
condition because it serves as a reminder that, although the wrongdoer never set out to 
become a bad person, he or she is fully capable in the present of changing course and can 
be considered blameworthy if he or she fails to properly use that capacity. We also 
predicted that placing people in a prosecutorial mindset would weaken the tendency for 
blame to be reduced by information about an unfortunate history. The rationale for such a 
prediction is that the prosecutorial mindset shifts a perceiver’s focus from the attributes 
of the wrongdoer to the need to restore social order by blaming and punishing bad 
behavior. With this shift in focus, wrongdoer attributes that would normally reduce blame 
(e.g., lack of control over self-formation) receive less weight. 
We presented three experiments that tested these ideas. All three studies varied 
the transgression narrative associated with James, an office bully. In one condition, James 
bullied based on a biological defect. In a second condition, James bullied based on 
morally offensive intentions. In a third condition, James bullied based on these same 
morally offensive intentions but the intentions were implanted in him by an unfortunate 
personal history. Our key prediction across the three experiments was that manipulations 
derived from the reasoning in the preceding paragraph—crossed with our transgression 
narrative manipulation—would selectively moderate blame and moral responsibility 
judgments in the implantation condition (See Figure 1). We anticipated less influence of 
the manipulations within the biological defect and intentional conditions. 
In Study 1, we crossed our transgression narratives with a manipulation 
highlighting James’ refusal to change. Our goal with the refusal to change manipulation 
was to selectively activate freedom of action perceptions, which would result in increased 
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ascriptions of blame and moral responsibility in the implantation condition. We did not 
find these effects. Furthermore, results suggest that our refusal to change manipulation 
did not increase freedom of action perceptions as intended. Instead, it increased control of 
self-formation perceptions. 
 In Study 2, we again crossed our existing transgression narratives with a 
manipulation highlighting one’s own ability to overcome predispositions. The 
manipulation was intended to increase perceptions of freedom of action and result in 
increased blame in the implantation condition. Blame responses did not show this 
predicted pattern. Additionally, the manipulation resulted in decreased perceptions of 
control of self-formation—not increased perceptions of freedom of action. However, we 
did find some evidence for our predicted effect: Participants indicate greater ascriptions 
of “encourage him to change” punishment responses after the overcoming predispositions 
task in the implantation condition. But this pattern was reversed for the biological defect 
and intentional conditions. 
 Study 3 manipulated whether participants were in the prosecutorial mindset prior 
to reading the transgression narratives. This mindset manipulation was meant to motivate 
observers to selectively attend to information relevant to culpability (to fulfill the goal of 
holding transgressors responsible in order to maintain order in society) and, thus, ignore 
deterministic information regarding an unfortunate personal history. Results suggest that 
some groups show this effect: Liberals, in the implantation condition blame marginally 
more when in the prosecutorial mindset. In contrast, conservatives, in the biological 
defect condition, blame significantly more in the prosecutorial mindset (and liberals 
blame less in the biological defect/prosecutorial mindset condition). 
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In sum, results across three studies are mixed with regard to whether people have 
inconsistent intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility. Some of our results 
(i.e., liberals in the prosecutorial mindset) indicate that people will ascribe moral 
responsibility even in an implantation (i.e., deterministic) scenario. The punishment 
findings in Study 2 corroborate these results: Participants indicate increased “encourage 
him to change” punishment responses in the implantation condition after completing the 
overcoming predispositions task. However, we found this pattern inconsistently across 
the three studies presented here. 
At this juncture, we have not found conclusive evidence in opposition to our 
hypotheses. Specifically, although Studies 1 and 2 did not show the predicted pattern of 
blame responses, it is clear that our freedom of action reminder manipulations were not 
manipulating the intended constructs. In both studies, the intended freedom of action 
reminder actually manipulated control of self-formation perceptions. In Study 1, the 
refusal to change manipulation resulted in increased perceptions of control of self-
formation (but unevenly across conditions). In contrast, in Study 2, the overcoming 
predispositions resulted in decreased perceptions of self-formation (again, unevenly 
across conditions). However, blame responses only minimally reflected these differences 
in free will perceptions. Despite the fact that the results of Study 1 and 2 suggest that our 
refusal to change and overcoming predispositions manipulations influence perceptions of 
control of self-formation, this free will perception did not transfer to blame responses, 
likely because the effect of the manipulation was, by all indicators, weak.  
Furthermore, these manipulations were not selectively influencing free will 
perceptions and moral responsibility ascriptions only in the implantation condition. We 
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consistently found significant differences in free will perceptions and punishment 
responses across all three transgression vignettes after the refusal to change and 
overcoming predispositions manipulations.  This finding was unexpected: We did not 
expect perceptions of free will or blame ascriptions to change in the biological defect 
condition because, in this condition it is impossible to increase free will perceptions due 
to the unchangeable, uncontrollable brain tumor. 
We have found some evidence that people do flip-flop between compatibilist and 
incompatibilist judgments (i.e., Study 2: punishment responses in implantation condition; 
Study 3: liberals in the implantation condition; conservatives in biological defect 
condition). However future studies should be focused on more effectively manipulating 
our reminders of freedom of action capabilities. Specifically, in Studies 1 and 2, our 
manipulations predominantly influenced control of self-formation ascriptions. Perhaps 
manipulations focused on James’ ability to exert willpower in other aspects of his life 
(e.g., forgoing a short term gain in order to achieve a long term goal), or a manipulation 
that highlights James’ mental activities when vacillating between two behavior options 
(e.g., bully or not bully) would selectively activate freedom of action perceptions. Or, it 
may be the case that motivational manipulations, such as the prosecutorial mindset study 
presented here, are better at selectively focusing participants’ attention away from the 
deterministic aspects of the scenario. Perhaps an experiment that manipulated relational 
mindsets (i.e., communal sharing versus authority ranking; Fiske, 1992) could result in 
increased blame responses in the implantation condition. In other words, it may be that 
the framing of the scenario [e.g., Is my goal to consider the well-being of others 
(communal sharing) or to compete with others (authority ranking)?] that determines 
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whether the intuition that deterministic information diminishes moral responsibility is 
relevant in this context. 
Conclusion 
Beliefs about determinism and moral responsibility are not black and white. 
Instead, sometimes knowledge of deterministic factors can diminish moral responsibility 
and at other times, it does not. In fact, people sometimes appear to be susceptible to 
motivations that can sway their ascriptions of moral responsibility—despite a 
deterministic scenario. However, this largely depends on preexisting characteristics of the 
individual (e.g., political ideology) and the nature of the scenario (e.g., in some cases 
unfortunate personal history no longer diminishes blame, in other cases a biological 
defect no longer diminishes blame). We see our work as taking an important theoretical 
step in terms of arguing that laypersons maintain flexible intuitions regarding 
determinism and moral responsibility. However, based on our findings, their intuitions 
are inconsistently activated based on the information available. Future experiments are 
necessary to solidify whether there is an underlying consistency and whether it is more 
strongly moderated by reminders of freedom of action capacities or motivational factors. 
We have found some evidence to support the claim that laypersons may appear 
compatibilist in some scenarios but incompatibilist in others when they are, in fact, 
neither. However, the extent to which they consistently apply compatibilist and 
incompatibilist responses remains an enigma.  
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Figure 1. Idealized predictions for Experiments 1-3. “Enabler of Implantation Effect” bars 
represent findings from Gill & Cerce (2013): Blame responses were significantly higher in the 
intentional condition compared to the implantation condition (despite equivalent intentionality 
perceptions). “Disabler of Implantation Effect” bars represent predicted blame responses of the 
studies presented here: When presented with a reminder of freedom of action or when 
experiencing heightened blame motivation, blame responses in the implantation condition will be 
comparable to the intentional condition—thus disabling the implantation effect. 
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Figure 2. Blame responses as a function of transgression narrative and refusal to change 
manipulation in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 3. Control of self-formation perceptions as a function of transgression narrative 
and refusal to change manipulation in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 4. “Encourage him to change” punishment responses as a function of 
transgression narrative and refusal to change manipulation in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 5. Blame responses as a function of transgression narrative and overcoming 
predispositions manipulation in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 6. Freedom of action perceptions as a function of transgression narrative and 
overcoming predispositions manipulation in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 7. “Encourage him to change” punishment responses as a function of 
transgression narrative and overcoming predispositions manipulation in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 8. Blame responses for liberals as a function of transgression narrative and 
prosecutorial mindset manipulation in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 9. Blame responses for conservatives as a function of transgression narrative and 
prosecutorial mindset manipulation in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 10. Freedom of action perceptions for liberals as a function of transgression 
narrative and prosecutorial mindset manipulation in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 11. Freedom of action perceptions for conservatives as a function of transgression 
narrative and prosecutorial mindset manipulation in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 12. Control of self-formation perceptions for liberals as a function of 
transgression narrative and prosecutorial mindset manipulation in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 13. Control of self-formation perceptions for conservatives as a function of 
transgression narrative and prosecutorial mindset manipulation in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 14. Moderated mediation models tested in Experiment 3. These models prescribe 
that the prosecutorial mindset manipulation and ideology interact to predict free will 
perceptions (freedom of action and control of self-formation) and that free will 
perceptions predict blame. 
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Figure 15. The mediated effect of mindset manipulation on blame via perceived freedom 
of action for conservatives and liberals in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 16. The mediated effect of mindset manipulation on blame via perceived control 
of self-formation for conservatives and liberals in Experiment 3. 
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Appendix A 
Intentional Transgression narrative 
James is the Vice President of a moderately sized company who will often 
humiliate and harass members of his staff. He says unkind things and implies that 
employees are unintelligent or incompetent. Employees avoid James as much as possible 
so that they will not be his next target. Unfortunately, there are few avenues for change in 
the company as James is the owner's son and employees are hesitant to file complaints 
against him. 
For James, bullying is a choice. His choice is driven mainly by a desire to be 
superior to others. He thinks that putting others down is "good sport" and that it is funny 
when other people are embarrassed. He often plans his insults in advance, timing them 
to achieve maximum impact. On occasions when others have asked James to reflect on 
what he is doing, this has produced no positive effect. James knows that he is making 
others suffer, but he feels that it is legitimate to do whatever it takes to "be on top." 
 
Implantation Transgression narrative 
James is the Vice President of a moderately sized company who will often 
humiliate and harass members of his staff. He says unkind things and implies that 
employees are unintelligent or incompetent. Employees avoid James as much as possible 
so that they will not be his next target. Unfortunately, there are few avenues for change in 
the company as James is the owner's son and employees are hesitant to file complaints 
against him. 
For James, bullying is a choice. His choice is driven mainly by a desire to be 
superior to others. He thinks that putting others down is "good sport" and that it is funny 
when other people are embarrassed. He often plans his insults in advance, timing them 
to achieve maximum impact. On occasions when others have asked James to reflect on 
what he is doing, this has produced no positive effect. James knows that he is making 
others suffer, but he feels that it is legitimate to do whatever it takes to "be on top." 
None of the employees are aware of the abusive personal relationship between 
James and his father. Throughout his childhood, James' father physically and verbally 
abused him. James was often told that he was worthless and an idiot. Whenever James 
upset his father, he would be whipped with a belt or even punched. To James' young 
mind, the lesson was that bullying is an appropriate strategy for getting people to do what 
you want them to do. James came to believe that one has two options in life: "Bully" or 
"victim." 
 
Biological defect Transgression narrative 
James is the Vice President of a moderately sized company who will often 
humiliate and harass members of his staff. He says unkind things and implies that 
employees are unintelligent or incompetent. Employees avoid James as much as possible 
so that they will not be his next target. Unfortunately, there are few avenues for change in 
the company as James is the owner's son and employees are hesitant to file complaints 
against him. 
A couple of years ago, James was diagnosed with a benign (i.e., not deadly) brain 
tumor that affects his frontal lobes. His doctor explained that the tumor is definitely the 
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cause of James' offensive social behavior. The doctor explained that tumors in that 
location make people aggressive and mean, even without provocation. Also, the doctor 
explained that the tumor would make James unable to inhibit his aggression because the 
self-control centers of his brain are affected. Thus, according to the doctor, it is 
completely impossible for James to control his unkindness.  
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Appendix B 
 
Refusal to Change Manipulation 
 
On numerous occasions, James' coworkers--and even some of his friends--have made 
appeals to him to change his behavior. But, James never changes. Some have become 
angry and tried assertive methods: "Knock it off, a**hole!!!" Many more have tried 
kindness: "James, life is difficult enough without us being unkind to each other. Would 
you please think about what you are doing, think about other people's feelings, and do 
your best to mellow out? Everyone here would be happier if we could all be friends, or at 
least leave each other in peace. Wouldn't that be better?" Despite repeated and varied 
persuasion attempts over the past year, James has not changed at all. 
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Appendix C 
 
Blame 
− I blame James for his bullying. 
− I feel moral anger or disapproval toward James. 
− I have strong feelings of dislike for James. 
− I feel indignation toward James because of how he treats others. 
 
Freedom of Action 
− By using his human capacity for free will, James could choose to STOP being a bully. 
− Although James may have a strong inclination to treat others poorly, he can use his 
human capacity for free will to change his behavior. 
− It is possible for James to use his free will to overcome his negative impulses and 
behave more appropriately. 
− Even if James has a strong desire to treat others poorly, he has the power to overcome 
that desire and treat others with respect. 
− James is not at the mercy of his impulses: He can make a choice to exercise self-
control of his behavior. 
− James is not doomed to be a bully his whole life: By using his power of free will he 
can change his ways. 
− Whereas James may be tempted to be mean, he does not have to yield to that 
temptation. 
 
Control of Self-Formation 
− James had free will in terms of initially BECOMING a bully. 
− Throughout his life, James was always in control of his personality development. 
− James’ character traits are purely a result of him freely choosing to become who he 
currently is. 
− Free choices that James made during his formative years are the primary reason he is 
the person he is today. 
− James deliberately and intentionally molded himself into the type of person that 
would bully others. 
 
Punishment – “Encourage him to change” 
− James should receive a clear warning from a superior: You will not be eligible for a 
raise until you start treating others with respect. 
− James should be required to see a psychologist who specializes in office bullying; the 
goal would be to help James see how his behavior affects others. 
− James should be required to attend an office etiquette seminar so he can learn how to 
appropriately treat his coworkers. 
− For every complaint filed against James, he should be required to meet with a human 
resources representative to encourage him to change his behavior. 
 
  78 
Punishment – “Mess with him” 
− It would be great to learn that one of James’ coworkers to “accidentally” spilled water 
on his laptop, destroying its contents. 
− I would be happy to hear that a project that James had been working on for over a 
year was “accidently” erased from his hard drive by a coworker. 
− I would be pleased to hear that James’ secretary was intentionally withholding 
important messages from him. 
− It would be great if his coworkers changed the clock in his office, making him late for 
an important meeting. 
− I wish someone would "put James in his place," and make him look foolish in front of 
everyone.  
− It would be great if James had to pay a step price for the way he treats his staff. 
 
Not Trying (refusal to change manipulation check) – Study 1 
− James has free will—he just needs to USE it. 
− James could change his ways if he would simply try harder to hear what others are 
telling him about his behavior. 
− James stubbornly refuses to exercise the power of choice that he has over his own 
behavior. 
− James is deliberately “thick-headed” and deliberately refuses to change. 
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Appendix D 
 
Overcoming Predispositions Task 
 
You will now complete a personal narrative task. Think of a time when you 
overcame—at least for a while—a powerful bad habit in your life. Specifically, try to 
think about a strong ‘bad habit’ or ‘negative predisposition’ you acquired from your 
family or prior life experiences. This should be a personality characteristic or behavior 
preference that you feel you learned over the course of your development. For example, 
something like ‘being critical of others,’ ‘having a bad temper,’ and ‘worrying too much’ 
are examples of traits you may have learned from your early experiences. 
Once you have decided on a bad habit, briefly describe a couple of occasions 
when you used your power of self-control or “will power” to defeat or suppress the 
impulse to act based on the bad habit. Write about how you were able to “overpower” 
that bad habit through exercising your will power. Specifically, write about the choices 
you made in order to overcome the impulse and to avoid its influence on your actions or 
decisions. 
Please provide as much detail as possible. 
 
Control Task 
 
You will now complete a personal narrative task. Think of a time when you had 
free time and had to make a decision about how to fill it. This should be a time when 
you had to make a decision about what to do for entertainment or otherwise you would 
have done nothing. For example, something like having an entire weekend off from 
school or work, or not making plans for spring break are examples of times you may have 
had free time to fill. 
Briefly describe a couple of occasions when you had to make a decision about 
what to do during your free time. Specifically, write about the decision process as you 
were weighing alternatives in order to ultimately decide how to fill your free time. 
Please provide as much detail as possible. 
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Appendix E 
 
Prosecutorial Mindset 
 
Here is the information about the company: 
 
Thirty years ago, the Hampton & Sons Corporation was a leader in industry and 
manufacturing. Most Hampton employees at the time reported feeling that their company 
was a remarkably enjoyable place to work. Indeed, the vast majority of employees 
respected each other and got along well. Back then, only a tiny fraction of employees got 
into trouble for harassing fellow staff members, and those who did were swiftly brought 
to justice. The company boasted a 96% claim rate, where most complaints about 
harassment were quickly responded to and remediated. 
 
Several years ago, however, the harassment rate began to soar and the rate of successful, 
effective responses to that harassment began to plummet. Since 2002, Hampton & Sons 
has been consistently ranked among the top ten most undesirable companies to work for 
in the United States. Last year was a record breaker: Claims regarding office bullying 
doubled and a record number of people (137) indicated that they suffered “severe 
emotional distress” as a result of being bullied. The human resources department is 
overwhelmed because of an ever-dwindling staff size due to the company's severe budget 
problems. Last year alone, response rates to claims fell to an all-time low of 4%: Only 4 
out of every 100 serious claims led to remediation.  
 
One of the most recent situations involved a prolonged period of bullying aimed at a shy 
and reserved member of the staff, Mr. Ronald Winfrey, 34. Over a period of months, one 
of Ronald’s coworkers would make degrading comments towards him, including making 
fun of his weight, appearance, eating habits, and intelligence. Ronald reported the 
harassment to the human resources department on multiple occasions but, due to being 
understaffed, the department was unable to process his claims. Over time, Ronald became 
increasingly depressed and started feeling like he was a worthless person. Finally, after 
months of belittlement and degradation, Ronald attempted suicide by taking a large dose 
of prescription painkillers. He slipped into a coma and died two days later. 
 
As has become typical at Hampton & Sons, Ronald’s coworker was never penalized for 
his harassment despite strong evidence implicating him. 
 
Generic Information 
 
Here is the information about the company: 
 
Thirty years ago, the Hampton & Sons Corporation was a leader in industry and 
manufacturing. Most Hampton employees worked on an assembly line, helping to 
produce automobile parts. Hampton & Sons was especially well known for their 
manufacture of a specific type of engine piston that helped to improve the lifetime of the 
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engine. Back then, only a tiny fraction of employees worked in an office, except for the 
managers and supervising staff. 
  
Several years ago, however, the company has undergone a major change in 
manufacturing. 
 
Since 2002, Hampton & Sons has transferred all production to a mechanical assembly 
line that does not require any manual labor on the part of the staff. Instead, many of the 
manufacturing workers take on the role of quality control, to ensure the engines are 
uniformly produced. Also, much of the staff now works as mechanics, ensuring that the 
machines are functioning properly. Currently, the majority of the employees have a 
bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, allowing them to make advanced 
modifications to the production machines. Because of this modernization, the workers 
now work in office spaces and are able to make changes to the mechanical production 
line on their computers. 
 
In light of these changes, Hampton & Sons remains a leader in the field for 
manufacturing automobile engine parts. 
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